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Searle is convinced that phenomenology is inadequate to face social-ontological problems. 
despite his opinion, collective intentionality in its positional effort can be explained 
through phenomenological reductions. Clarifying how husserl comes to the evidence of the 
background within the exercise of the transcendental reduction, it has to be shown how 
the frame of primordinal reduction could make an inner description of the plural first-
person perspective possible. finally, some of the reasons that left husserl to be completely 
overlooked in the contemporary debate on collective intentionality are exposed. The 
suspicion that is aroused by husserl’s transcendental phenomenology could be dispelled 
if one only considers the social-ontological value of the structure of collective positionality 
that husserl claims to be the condition of possibility for the experience of objectivity.  
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if phenomenology is the study of consciousness as experienced from a 
first-person perspective, the structure of collective intentionality should 
belong to the main themes of phenomenological research. indeed, in 
Husserl’s reflections we find several attempts to sketch a methodology in 
order to thematize the plural first-person perspective in contrast to the 
singular one, as it is provisionally given in the solipsistic account (hua 
iv). these attempts are primarily carried out in order to clarify both the 
intersubjective background against and the common ground upon which 
objectivity is experienced. given this transcendental aim, the descriptive 
value of Husserl’s phenomenological research on the plural first-person 
perspective was overlooked, if not misunderstood, as an idealistic 
foundational enterprise. i will not face here the problems of husserl’s own 
social ontology, i.e. the problems concerning the constitution of the human 
world through collective attitudes or of the foundation of common mind 
and higher order personalities by collective intentionality (hua iv, hua vi, 
hua Xiv, caminada 2011). i will rather show how collective intentionality in 
its positional effort can be revealed through two forms of phenomenological 
reductions husserl worked out: 1. transcendental reduction (hua iii/1); 2. 
primordinal reduction (hua i) interpreted as a form of reduction to the we (hua 
XV). Both reductions were designed to find a descriptive clue to solve the big 
philosophical problem that obsessed husserl throughout his life: how can 
subjective minds posit objectivity?
in the last part of this contribution i will uncover some of the reasons 
that led to the fact that husserl has been completely overlooked in the 
contemporary debate on collective intentionality.  
one of the tasks of the transcendental reduction is to enable us to follow the 
evidence of the positional background through which we take for granted 
the evidence of the real world. Following the inner structure of simple 
experience, one can see how intentionality is always embedded in a more 
complex whole. We experience much more than what we presently intend: 
given a perspective or a fragment of something, we experience it as real. 
When we say 1. “P is there”, we don’t intend only the side we actually see, 
but the totality of the object. in further experience one can change idea and 
state: 2. “P is not real, it was only a shape, i confused myself!”. Switching 
from 1 to 2 presupposes that the intentional structure of the experience 
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upon which the subject is judging changed and forced the subject to switch 
its position toward the object. P is not anymore seen as real. When we take 
something as real or apparent, possible or dubious we are taking a position 
toward what we presently experience. We are posing this perceived element 
as real or apparent, as possible or dubious. the characteristic to be real or 
apparent, possible or dubious is not given instantaneously. it exceeds the 
actual moment of intentionality. husserl calls this surplus positionality. the 
task of transcendental reduction is to neutralize all positions concerning 
the existence of the intentional contents. Bracketing what we usual take 
for granted we realize by contrast that in every actual experience we posit 
more than we actually perceive. Furthermore we discover that positionality 
is a continuous effort that we usually don’t mind, such as a background noise 
or our breath. But where does this surplus of meaning that positionality 
attributes to what we actually perceive come from? What kind of reasons do 
we have to accord or not to accord reality to something we perceive? 
according to husserl, every intentional act arises not only on the basis of 
an intentional horizon but also against a background of experience which 
produces intentional habits and offers the frames through which every new 
experience of the same type can be anticipated. the mind has no atomic 
structure: every intentional experience implies a focus and a situated 
network of potential links that frame it. thanks to this implicit holistic 
frame the intentional content is meaningfully enriched. it is only according 
to the implicit situation that one is inclined, for example, to posit a shape 
not as a real person but as a mannequin if one is entering a clothes store. the 
increasing knot of meanings related to an intentional content develops into 
a framework through which every type of this token will be experienced. 
this meaningful framework is the intentional schema that configures 
every new encounter with similar objects or situations (lohmar 2008, 103). 
husserl calls this schema type and the process of its development typification. 
He defines types as a form of habitus, because, as any other habitual 
structure, types present an enactive moment, i.e. a punctual act that 
originates this structure, that is kept further in force and can be reenacted 
through endorsement or expire once it is given up. mental life is therefore 
characterized as a never-ending dynamic of typification, i.e. sedimentation 
of experienced intentional networks in habitual structures that can be 
aroused in the encounter with similar objects.
every experience with its positional structures sediments itself and becomes 
stable “ground” for further experiences, motivating fantasies, actions, or 
expectations that drive further perceptions, etc. 
husserl describes the web of potential and habitual positionality that 
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surrounds every intended content as the background against which the 
subject experiences it. this background is therefore not a hypothesis about 
some non-intentional functions, it is an intentional structure articulated 
according to an intentional modality (habitus) that we can directly 
experience. 
So far i exposed how husserl describes the way in which what we have access 
to in perception receives its positional character against the background of 
our concrete experience. the second step is to show how our own experience 
is not owned in the sense of a private one. it is ours in a stronger sense, but in 
the meantime own. 
husserl claims that through the encounter with other embodied minds 
one’s own background is radically modified. This radical modification 
becomes evident through the method of primordinal reduction. in the 
background of a concrete subjectivity, there are not only the structures 
that he or she acquired in his or her experience, but also all the intentional 
structures that are related to other subjects, or, as husserl would say, 
that are implicated by other subjects. this is very important in order to 
understand the result of the phenomenological reductions (which usually 
are operated by a socialized adult): “Phenomenological reduction does not 
lead me back to my private inner life and its positional effort. Wherever i 
met other subjectivities, this or that subject, or a plurality of other egos, 
the phenomenological reduction leads me back to a plural subjectivity 
that embraces my subjectivity and all these counterparts with their life, 
with all their phenomena and intentional correlation” (hua XXXv, 111). 
Phenomenology, the study of consciousness from a first-person perspective, 
is not solipsistically imprisoned in individual life: among the first-person 
perspectives that one can phenomenologically study, belongs also the plural 
one. the phenomenological reduction can be led not only by the structure 
of ego cogito of the one who is meditating on one’s intentional effort, but 
also by the structure of nos cogitamus (hua viii, 316). the task to reach “a 
transcendental sociological phenomenology” (hua iX, 539) lies in the aimed 
developments of husserl’s philosophy. 
husserl speaks therefore about a We-mode of intentionality and tries also 
to develop a pertaining method of description in order to understand 
the nature of the intentional background against which we experience 
objectivity. if in the background we can explicate the horizon of the whole 
world, whose background is that? how can my individual intentional life be 
embedded into this intersubjective network? Where does the horizon of my 
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one attempt to answer these questions is shaped in husserl’s own 
interpretation of the primordinal reduction (hua i) as a “peculiar reduction 
to the We” (hua Xv, 66). this reduction can be static or genetic. it is static 
if we describe the structure of socialized experience. it is genetic if we 
describe the process of socialization. according to husserl, these are 
possible questions of a static analysis of We-intentionality: “how do we 
experience the world, this world that we experience together and we have 
experienced in our world life always together? how can we describe this 
world ontologically? how do we experience its modality? how can every 
community experience its particular communal world with its cultural 
predicates? the formal structure of the genetic process of socialisation can 
be thematized through primordinal reduction: given our life-world we can 
try to reduce my life only to my private cogitationes, where i experience 
the world as it is given only for me. i reduce myself to my primordinal ego 
and then i ask how it became social, how could a communal world and a 
community be experienced [...]” (ibid.). 
this methodology is a particular form of deconstructive reduction (abbau-
reduktion): the aim is to try to neutralize our positional acts and efforts that 
depend and rely on other subjects. i quote husserl’s words: “we disregard all 
constitutional effects of intentionality relating non-mediately or mediately 
to other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual 
and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself 
a peculiar owness” (hua i, §44). through this selective disregard of some 
positional acts we are performing a very peculiar abstraction within 
the background. it is a very new sense of abstraction. We live naturally 
as differentiated and contrasted from others – me and you; that’s me: 
i can abstract myself; i remain alone. But the primordinal reduction is 
not a kind of transcendental robinson crusoe. as husserl stresses, we 
are not thinking about the last man after a pest. on the contrary we are 
revealing an essential structure of intentionality, a core of owness in 
subjective intentional life. But this core of owness is very poor. it is our 
bodily experience, an experience that knows no objectivity, because 
everything experienced is only linked to my own experience. husserl puts 
out that the experience of objectivity belongs to a higher level than that of 
primordinal experience. disregarding all positionality that is embedded 
into the experience with other subjects, one could somehow experience 
a coherent reality, but nothing like objectivity. husserl claims that his 
philosophy is a form of intersubjective transcendental philosophy because 
the positional efforts that enable us to take the objective reality of the 
world for granted are interwoven in intersubjective, social intentional life. 
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Without social cognition, we could say, there is no cognition of objectivity. 
We can experience an objective world because we are a We, because we 
are socialized. We can also idealize our social experience in the form of 
“everyone would agree that […] ” and therefore sediment in our background 
the sights of our community and of the rational collectivity we aim to 
belong to. 
if husserl tried to develop the methodologies of phenomenological 
reductions in order to describe the inner nature of collective intentionality 
in its positional effort, why has this task been completely overlooked in the 
contemporary debate on collective intentionality? now i would like to offer 
some historical and theoretical reasons for this fact. 
the main reason lies in the misunderstandings of husserl’s controversial 
way of calling himself a “transcendental idealist”. his aim was to give a 
“philosophical” name to his attempt to justify that naturalistic objectivity 
is to be explained through a rich eidetic description of subjective life. this 
was in his mind the philosophical task of our time. Similarly, Searle sees 
the challenge that philosophy has nowadays to face in the conciliation 
of natural sciences with the subjective character of personal life (Searle 
2010). the architecture of Searle’s social ontology provides in his eyes 
for the peculiar objectivity of social reality, since the latter cannot 
exhibit the naturalistic sources of scientific evidence. In fact, for both 
husserl and Searle, questions of social ontology are embedded in their 
philosophical projects and linked to the task of looking for the peculiar 
objectivity of everyday social life. Despite that, Searle is firmly convinced 
that phenomenology is inadequate to face the problems of contemporary 
social ontology and especially to describe the inner structure of collective 
intentionality. i claim that this belief is rooted more in the misleading 
criticism of Searle’s colleague and rival in Berkeley, the heideggerian 
philosopher hubert dreyfus, than in phenomenology itself (Searle 1999, 
2000, dreyfus 1993, 2000, 2002). the paradigmatic problem of social ontology, 
i.e. how can mind-dependent structures be understood to be real and 
objective, was not ignored by husserl: as a matter of facts, it was the problem 
he faced throughout his whole life!
if phenomenology has been rediscovered in the last years as an interesting 
travel mate for analytic social ontology (de monticelli 2011), husserl was 
not. an important note: speaking about phenomenology in singular is 
misleading, since we can distinguish at least three main streams only 
within german phenomenology and many other rills in further european 
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german Phenomenology are: 1. the “orthodox” husserlian, transcendental 
one; 2. the realistic and personalistic approach of the early circles of munich 
and göttingen; 3. the existential shift driven by heidegger.
Social ontology up to now only encountered the last two forms of 
phenomenology. Social-ontological questions have been nowadays 
recognized as embedded into the tradition of early, realistic phenomenology 
(Salice 2011), since through the pioneering work of the “Seminar for austro-
german  Philosophy” an important bridge was built in the 80s between 
the revaluation of reinach’s account of social acts and Searle’s speech acts 
theory (mulligan 1987). We have to thank Schmid (2005) for having revealed 
a non-individualistic account of heidegger’s dasein, and working out a 
new positive phenomenological understanding of We-intentionality. his 
personal research is rooted both in the realistic and existential tradition of 
phenomenology, as well as in contemporary analytical philosophy.
husserl himself never took part in the social-ontological reassessment 
of phenomenology. Why is that? Both mulligan and Schmid believe that 
husserl became harnessed in a “monological” account of intentionality that 
led him to his shift towards kant’s idealism. Searle should have claimed 
that with his own turn to idealism, husserl tragically helped his project of 
a descriptive and scientific philosophy to vanish (as cited in Mulligan 2003). 
Because of these biases, husserlian phenomenology up to now has not been 
taken in consideration as a social-ontological challenge.  
this image of husserl is not anymore maintainable. the elephantine 
publication of the husserliana volumes and the actual husserlian research 
have confuted most of this criticism. therefore, we need to rehabilitate 
husserl, not only as a subject of history of philosophy, but also as a good 
philosophical partner for contemporary debates. husserlian studies 
themselves could profit from the contemporary debate in social ontology, 
since it facilitates the systematisation of husserl’s attempts in order to 
describe the plural first-person perspective (e.g. distinguishing between 
common intentionality as the concrete intentionality of a group’s mind and 
open intersubjectivity as the universalizing idealisation of the former as the 
implicated telos of the pretension of objectivity). 
Searle further believes that phenomenology can neither explain how 
intentionality refers to its conditions of satisfaction, nor how it is linked 
to the background. Both claims are unjustified. Husserl worked out the 
problem of the rationality of intentionality (its different styles of evidence 
in reference to intuitive conditions of satisfaction) and of the background, 
beginning with his ideas (hua iii/1). i am not at all claiming that husserl 
already said what Searle discovered. their concepts of intentionality 
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are very far apart from each other, despite the caricatured polemic 
of dreidegger (nome de guerre of dreyfus, combination of himself and 
heidegger) against hussearle (chimera of husserl and Searle), where dreyfus 
thinks to make Searle the victim of the same confutations he believes 
heidegger could make with husserl (Beyer 1997, dreyfus 2002). that is fair 
neither to husserl nor to Searle!
there are actually at least two relevant statements about the nature of 
intentionality that Searle does not share with husserl: 1. husserl describes 
non-propositional forms of intentionality (both conceptual and non-
conceptual); 2. husserl does not explain intentionality via causality, rather 
causality via intentionality. nevertheless Searle shares with husserl the 
ideals of truth, rationality, and objectivity, since they aim into the same 
direction to reform philosophy as a descriptive and scientific discipline. 
Furthermore, husserl also shares with mulligan and Searle the belief that 
realism is part of the taken-for-granted background of our practices. 
realism to husserl is a natural and sane everyday attitude, but he does not 
take it philosophically for granted. he picks up the modern transcendental 
question (Why do we take the real world for granted?) and tries to answer 
it phenomenologically, i.e. within a methodological description (how do we 
take the real world for granted?). Because of the answers he gives, he tried 
to define his philosophy as a peculiar form of transcendental idealism. 
the huge peculiarity of his idealism is that it is not a form of subjective 
idealism, but rather an intersubjective one (Zahavi 2001), since it involves 
the peculiar social-ontological idealisation that leads to the ideal of an open 
intersubjectivity. 
Strange as it may sound, husserl would agree with Searle’s arguments 
against subjective idealism. given one of the arguments for idealism, 
Searle refutes: “1. all we have access to in perception are the contents of 
our own experiences. 2. the only epistemic basis we can have for claims 
about the external world are our perceptual experiences. therefore, 3. The 
only reality we can meaningfully speak of is the reality of perceptual experiences” 
(Searle 1995, 172). Husserl would not even accept the first point, because he 
claims that what we have access to in our perception is not only the content 
of a private experience but can rather be coordinated and sedimented 
in the background as a collective and common one. therefore, i claim that 
the foundation of husserl’s phenomenological philosophy relies on his 
understanding of collective intentionality as the way through which the 
positional processes of constitution sediment in the intentional background 
through socialization (Vergemeinschaftung). my aim was not to argue for the 
validity of this foundation, but to show that because of this goal, husserl 
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tried to describe the intentional structure of collective intentionality within 
the methodological frame of the two peculiar phenomenological reductions 
discussed above: 1. Transcendental reduction (hua iii/1); 2. Primordinal 
reduction (hua i) as a form of reduction to the We (hua Xv).
returning to Searle’s premise in the rejected argument for subjective 
idealism (“all we have access to in perception are the contents of our 
own experiences”), we can attest that there is a peculiar method to try to 
experience according to this premise, relying only on the experiences that 
arise in the sphere of owness. husserl tried to show what would be given in 
such a case. We can be sceptic about the method of primordinal reduction, 
but it is clear that he didn’t claim that the constitution of the natural world 
is a private, monological problem, since within the sphere of owness there 
is no background based on which we could take for granted the objective 
world, as we always do. in order to intend the world as real and objective, 
our experience structurally depends on collective positionality. 
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